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Bankruptcy & Bailouts, Subsidies & Stimulus:
The Government Toolset for Responding to
Market Distress
Anthony J. Casey†

In the spring of 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic shut down economies around the world, pressure arose for governments to respond to
the growing threat of pandemic-related market distress.1 In addition to
responding to the direct public health emergency, governments were
expected to stabilize markets—both financial and economic—and provide relief to those harmed by the pandemic’s market effects.
In the United States,2 the initial proposals for government action
varied in nature and focus. Some proposals targeted the financial system,3 while some targeted small businesses4 and individuals.5 Others

†

Donald M. Ephraim Professor of Law and Economics; Faculty Director of The Center on
Law and Finance. I thank Madeline Prebil and Leonor Suarez for excellent research assistance.
The Richard Weil Faculty Research Fund and the Paul H. Leffman Fund provided generous support.
1
I use the term “market distress” as a general term that includes both economic and financial
distress. The distinction between financial and economic distress, and its importance, is discussed
throughout this article.
2
I focus on the United States. While the analysis applies more generally, the specifics with
regard to institutions, existing laws, proposals, and government actions differ across jurisdictions.
3
See, e.g., Kevin P. Gallagher et al., Safety First: Expanding the Global Financial Safety Net
in
Response
to
COVID-19,
12
GLOBAL
POL’Y
140
(2021),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12871 [https://perma.cc/AA33-M9FG].
4
See, e.g., Shaun Shuxun Wang, Government Support for SMEs in Response to COVID-19:
Theoretical Model Using Wang Transform (Swiss Fin. Inst. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No.
20-59,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608646
[https://perma.cc/K3AS-6YHC]; Hal Scott, The Fed Needs to Move Faster, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10,
2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fed-needs-to-move-faster-11586557721
[https://perma.cc/ASH9-VCQZ].
5
See, e.g., Phil Lord, Incentivising Employment During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 8 THEORY
&
PRAC.
LEGIS.
355
(2020),
https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2020.1792635
[https://perma.cc/UU9J-XZDW]; Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel, Bankruptcy and the Discount
Window (Nov. 15, 2020) (preliminary draft).
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were intended to bail out large businesses6 and specific industries.7 Still
other proposals took a more institutional focus.8 In the context of bankruptcy law, many imagined building up the bankruptcy system as a primary bulwark against a seemingly imminent wave of economic and financial distress.9
With the exception of measures related to financial markets, the
actual responses formed a chaotic mix of disconnected half measures
that neither stabilized the economy nor provided meaningful relief to
those most affected.10 While that failure may be attributed in part to
general government dysfunction and legislative gridlock, a large part of
the problem arises from the lack of a clearly identified purpose and
framework to guide government responses.
To prepare for the next crisis, we must use this failure to better
understand the toolset available to governments dealing with economic
and financial threats. The main lessons to take away are that the choice
of tools deployed by governments to alleviate a crisis should depend on
the nature of the specific problem at hand and that scattershot approaches are unlikely to work.

6

See, e.g., Ken Judd & Karl Schmedders, Why the U.S. Government Needs a New Corporate
Bailout Structure—One That Doesn’t Rely on Loans, FORTUNE (Apr. 16, 2020), https://fortune.com
/2020/04/16/coronavirus-economic-impact-government-bailout-business-loans-preferred-stock/
[https://perma.cc/45FP-PGEY].
7
See, e.g., Megersa Abate et al., Government Support to Airlines in the Aftermath of the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 89 J. AIR TRANSPORT MGMT. 101931 (2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969699720305147 [https://perma.cc/2EC9-UB5W] (endorsing government support for the airlines industry); see also Fabian Stephany et al., The Corisk-Index: A
Data-Mining Approach to Identify Industry-Specific Risk Assessments Related to COVID-19 in
Real-Time (Working Paper No. 2003.12432v3, 2020), https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2003.12432.html [https://perma.cc/NY5S-V9VB] (creating an online index to identify industries most in need of government support due to economic shocks from COVID-19).
8
See, e.g., Philip Rocco et al., Stuck In Neutral? Federalism, Policy Instruments, And CounterCyclical Responses to COVID-19 in the United States, 39 POL’Y & SOC’Y 458 (2020),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14494035.2020.1783793
[https://perma.cc/6JT84PWU]; Stuti Khemani, An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in Public Institutions in
the Time of COVID-19 (World Bank: Rsch & Pol’y, Brief No. 148256, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3602352 [https://perma.cc/DJL9-Z6FQ].
9
See, e.g., Benjamin Iverson et al., Estimating the Need for Additional Bankruptcy Judges in
Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 11 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE (2020), https://www.hblr.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/18/2021/01/HBLR-Estimating-the-Need-for-Additional-Bankruptcy-JudgesProof_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T2J-PFUQ]; see also Robin Greenwood et al., Sizing up Corporate
Restructuring in the COVID Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28104, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3731274 [https://perma.cc/TAQ7-C62G]; Edward Morrison & Andrea C.
Saavedra, Bankruptcy’s Role in the COVID-19 Crisis (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 624,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567127
[https://perma.cc/JRE4KEHR].
10
I focus on the events and actions taken in 2020 at the beginning of the pandemic. The narrative of these events will necessarily become incomplete as the pandemic continues and further
government measures are adopted. For example, in 2021, the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021
provided an additional $1.9 trillion in stimulus and relief funding. But the broader lessons and
framework will remain valid.
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As obvious as those lessons may seem, they were largely ignored in
2020. Much of the confusion in pandemic responses is attributable to
attempts to use the wrong tools and to implementation of measures that
lacked any clear purpose. In particular, governments and commentators lost sight of two important distinctions in deciding how to act. First
is the distinction between tools appropriate for addressing economic distress and those appropriate for addressing financial distress. Second is
the distinction between a systemic crisis where distress is spreading
and an instance of firm-specific distress where the harm—though perhaps large—is contained.
These distinctions present four types of market distress: specific
economic, systemic economic, specific financial, and systemic financial.
Each type is distinct from the others, and for each there is a category of
appropriate government responses (respectively): direct subsidies, general stimulus, bankruptcy proceedings, and financial bailouts. We thus
have this matrix:
TABLE 1
Specific

Systemic

Economic

Direct Subsidies

General Stimulus

Financial

Bankruptcy Proceedings
(Chapter 11)

Financial Bailouts

The importance of understanding these classifications is most evident in the flawed proposals for pandemic-related fixes to bankruptcy
law and in the lack of a centralized economic plan to support failing
small businesses around the country.
This Article is an attempt to clarify the appropriate (and the inappropriate) government tools for responding to different forms of market
distress. In Part I, I provide a brief review of the market-related responses to the pandemic. I discuss actions the United States government has taken,11 various proposals that have been considered, and
some of the economic and financial effects that have resulted. In Part
II, I lay out a framework for thinking about government responses to
market distress. I describe the four types of distress and explain the fit
of each type with a specific category of tools. In Part III, I provide a
closer look at and place special emphasis on the interaction between
pandemic responses and bankruptcy law because bankruptcy’s role has

11

Some relevant responses in the United States came from state governments, largely in the
form of measures to halt evictions. I discuss those briefly along the way.
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been the most obviously misunderstood and provides the starkest example of confused analysis.
I. THE RESPONSES AND THE RESULTS (SO FAR)
In the early days of the pandemic, robust debates arose about government relief for markets. Proposals were floated from all directions
and suggested all sorts of relief. For good reason—markets were cratering,12 unemployment was soaring,13 and uncertainty was extreme14—
experts were racing to get ideas into the public debate.15 While many of

12

Fred Imbert, Dow Drops Nearly 3,000 Points, as Coronavirus Collapse Continues; Worst
Day Since ‘87, CNBC (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/15/traders-await-futuresopen-after-fed-cuts-rates-launches-easing-program.html [https://perma.cc/J3WU-5VH9]; Gunjan
Banerji et al., Stocks Decline as Investors Digest Collapse in Jobs Market, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 3,
2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-stock-markets-dow-update-4-3-2020-11585887307
[https://perma.cc/32RL-HBNP].
13
In March 2020, the unemployment rate increased by 0.9 percentage points to 4.4 percent;
in April 2020, the unemployment rate increased by 10.3 percentage points to 14.7 percent. The
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that this increase represented “the highest rate
and the largest over-the-month increase in the history of the series [beginning in January 1948].”
Employment Situation—March 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_04032020.htm [https://perma.cc/RF6H-DP4P];
Employment Situation—April 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (May 8, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05082020.htm [https://perma.cc/Z922-64M5].
14
See, e.g., Robin Wigglesworth, Coronavirus Creates Biggest Economic Uncertainty in Decades, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/4d77ab77-0ff0-46ff-b30eae712c582457 [https://perma.cc/6WVC-J3EA] (reporting that the “global economic outlook is the
murkiest in modern history, with uncertainty over the coronavirus outbreak’s ultimate impact
causing wild divergences between analysts’ forecasts”).
15
See supra notes 3–9 and accompanying text; see also Letter from the Nat’l Bankr. Conference to Reps. Pelosi and McCarthy and Sens. McConnell and Schumer, regarding Economic Crisis
Caused
by
SARS-CoV-2
Virus
(Mar.
22,
2020),
https://drive.google.com/file/d
/1oyWbkJgFj3Y_jKr4mRVJpQduXvqGzl1H/view [https://perma.cc/FC8K-SRNS]; Letter from the
Nat’l Bankr. Conference to Reps. Pelosi and McCarthy and Sens. McConnell and Schumer, regarding Further Economic Assistance for Individuals and Businesses in Financial Distress as a Result
of Crisis Caused by SARS-CoV-2 Virus (Apr. 14, 2020), https://drive.google.com/file
/d/1OSA_Yhft3eMn3aqv3bRTcLZeQWXSA8Om/view [https://perma.cc/KK9L-JP79]; Kenneth
Ayotte & David Skeel, Bankruptcy Law Needs a Boost for Coronavirus, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 30,
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankruptcy-law-needs-a-boost-for-coronavirus-11585608800
[https://perma.cc/ZB3Y-GDRG]; Morrison & Saavedra, supra note 9; Adam Levitin & Satyam
Khanna, How to Get Money to Small Businesses Fast, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/24/opinion/coronavirus-small-businesses.html [https://perma.cc/8ZHZ-VATM];
Letter from Brook Gotberg, Chair, Bankr. & COVID-19 Working Grp., to Reps. Pelosi and McCarthy and Sens. McConnell and Schumer (May 26, 2020), http://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/files/2020/06/Small-Business-Letter-Final-5.26.20-pm.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A67PCQW]; Letter from Jared A. Ellias, Chair, Large Corps. Comm. of Bankr. & COVID-19 Working
Grp., to Reps. Pelosi and McCarthy and Sens. McConnell and Schumer (May 20, 2020),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/files/2020/05/xLarge-Corporate-Committee_05.18.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/X47X-VF9T]; Letter from Jared A. Ellias, Chair, Large Corps.
Comm. of Bankr. & COVID-19 Working Grp., to Reps. Pelosi and McCarthy and Sens. McConnell
and Schumer (June 10, 2020), https://considerchapter13.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Letterto-Congress-re-Number-of-Bankruptcy-Judges-6.10.20-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXD2-43CG]
(attaching memorandum authored by Benjamin Iverson et al.); Pamela Foohey et al., The Debt
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the proposals had individual merit, few were part of anything resembling a cohesive approach.
It is not surprising then that the initial response in the United
States—which took the form of legislation and administrative action at
both the federal and state levels—was mostly a hodgepodge of measures
that provided disconnected patches of relief. Thus, for example, the
CARES Act, signed into law on March 27, 2020,16 made $50 billion
available for relief to large airlines, and $17 billion to Boeing,17 while
providing nothing to elderly and disabled adults. As Professor Daniel
Hemel put it, “The result is that the largest aid package in U.S. history—intended to afford relief from the consequences of COVID-19—
gives nothing at all to millions of people in the population segment most
vulnerable to the novel coronavirus.”18
The most significant economic relief in the CARES Act—and the
closest to getting things right—was the Paycheck Protection Program
(PPP).19 Under that program, small businesses were offered direct relief. But the rollout was chaotic,20 large portions of funds went to large
companies and wealthy law firms that did not need relief,21 and some of
Collection Pandemic, 11 CAL. L. REV. ONLINE 222 (2020), https://www.californialawreview.org/debt-collection-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/474W-QXFL]; Morgan Ricks & Lev Menand,
Let’s Pay the Stimulus in Digital Dollars, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-03-24/coronavirus-stimulus-let-s-pay-it-in-digital-dollars
[https://perma.cc/B4NL-3XGJ]; How Far Could the Fed Go in Responding to COVID-19?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 23, 2020), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/contibrown-fed-actions/ [https://perma.cc/W59T-APE2].
16
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134
Stat. 281 (2020).
17
Ultimately, Boeing never accessed the funds. Yeganeh Torbati & Aaron Gregg, How a $17
Billion Bailout Fund Intended for Boeing Ended Up in Very Different Hands, WASH. POST (Nov.
25, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/11/25/boeing-national-security-bailoutloans/ [https://perma.cc/X8CR-J8H4] (“Aircraft manufacturers including Boeing were the fund’s
intended recipients but balked at the terms and did not apply.”).
18
Daniel Hemel, Stiffed by the Senate Stimulus: The Surprising Group Left Out of the Coronavirus Rescue Bill, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/nyoped-stiffed-by-the-senate-stimulus-20200326-624qm3qnvbhw7py2unylqpd6iy-story.html
[https://perma.cc/L6TT-YJMX].
19
For a summary of the PPP, see Ilya Beylin, The Ignominious Life of the Paycheck Protection
Program, 23 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2021).
20
Stacy Cowley et al., Small-Business Loan Program, Chaotic From Start, Gets 2nd Round,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/business/ppp-small-businessloans.html [https://perma.cc/X5RY-FN4S]; Stacy Cowley, Small-Business Loans Will Be Forgiven,
but Don’t Ask How, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/business/small-business-ppp-loans-forgiveness.html [https://perma.cc/HK5W-BFBF]; see also Beylin, supra note 19 (collecting and analyzing the merits of various criticisms of the PPP).
21
Erik Sherman, Many Public Companies That Got PPP Loans Had Lots in the Bank, FORBES
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2020/04/24/public-companies-ppploans-money/?sh=4a7e162640d2 [https://perma.cc/EX6Q-WRHD] (noting that despite Treasury
guidance—which suggested that public companies with substantial market value should be able
to obtain credit elsewhere—hundreds of high-revenue public companies accessed PPP funds);
Stacy Cowley & Ella Koeze, 1 Percent of P.P.P. Borrowers Got Over One-Quarter of the Loan Money,
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the firms that most needed it were denied relief because of rules preventing firms in bankruptcy from accessing the program.22
States and administrative agencies also provided other forms of
economic relief. For example, most states temporarily halted evictions
to some degree through executive or legislative action, and others provided similar relief through judicial measures.23 And on September 4,
2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) released an agency
order that temporarily halted certain residential evictions in all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and most U.S. territories.24
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/business/paycheck-protection-program-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/7DAD-TUXR] (reporting that “powerful law firms like
Boies Schiller Flexner, restaurants like the steakhouse chain started by Ted Turner, as well as the
operator of New York’s biggest horse tracks” were among the 600 businesses that received the
maximum loan amount of $10 million); see also Zachary Warmbrodt, SBA Presses Big Businesses
to Justify Aid, Sparking Uproar, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020
/10/30/sba-big-businesses-ppp-loans-433736 [https://perma.cc/62HM-47Q5] (stating that the Small
Business Administration’s (“SBA’s”) effort to scrutinize large businesses that obtained PPP loans
have rattled banks and PPP borrowers alike).
Notably, the new PPP provisions authorized by H.R. 133, the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2021 (enacted on December 27, 2020, as Public Law 116-260) prohibit publicly-traded companies with securities listed on a national securities exchange from accessing PPP funds. See Interim
Final Rule, Business Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program Second
Draw Loans, 86 Fed. Reg. 3712 (Jan. 14, 2021).
22
PPP funds were administered by the Small Business Administration. Based on its reading
of its existing statutory authority and the authority granted to it by the CARES Act, the SBA made
PPP relief available only to borrowers not presently in bankruptcy. While some bankruptcy courts
tried to get around this rule, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts held that bankruptcy courts
may not compel the SBA to make PPP loans available to debtors in bankruptcy. See In re Gateway
Radiology Consultants, P.A., 983 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Ronald A. Spinner et al.,
Eleventh Circuit Joins Fifth in Holding That the SBA May Deny Paycheck Protection Program
Loans to Debtors in Bankruptcy, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/eleventh-circuit-joins-fifth-holding-sba-may-deny-paycheck-protection-program-loans
[https://perma.cc/TGG8-8DXS].
In its newest round of PPP authorization, Congress provided that—subject to the SBA Administrator’s approval—certain debtors in bankruptcy may be eligible for PPP loans. The SBA,
however, has withheld such approval. In its interim final rules, the SBA expressly stated that
debtors in bankruptcy are ineligible for PPP loans. See Ronald A. Spinner et al., Congress Permits
SBA to Make PPP Loans to Debtors in Bankruptcy, SBA Says “No”, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 15, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-permits-sba-to-make-ppp-loans-to-debtors-bankruptcy-sba-says-no [https://perma.cc/5W55-X73L].
23
See Practical Law Real Estate, COVID-19: Commercial and Residential Tenant Eviction
Moratoriums Select State and Local Laws Tracker (US), WESTLAW (last updated June 4, 2021).
24
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to
Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 55292 (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/04/2020-19654/temporary-halt-in-residential-evictions-to-prevent-the-further-spread-of-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/S63B-WVFL]. That order was set to expire
on December 31, 2020 but was extended to January 31, 2021 by the December relief legislation.
Jemima McEvoy, Stimulus Bill Extends Eviction Moratorium by One Month—Experts Worry What
Comes After, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2020/12/22
/stimulus-bill-extends-eviction-moratorium-by-one-month-experts-worry-what-comes-after
/?sh=9d2a77c493c5 [https://perma.cc/Z534-QQFJ]. On January 20, 2021, at President Biden’s urging, the CDC extended the eviction moratorium again until at least March 31, 2021. Media Statement, Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Director Rochelle P. Walensky, MD, MPH, on
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One exception to the chaos was the financial response. Centralized
in the hands of the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department, the financial relief was swift and comprehensive, with some of the core programs going into effect before any legislation was enacted. Thus, on
March 17 and 18, 2020, the Federal Reserve announced three major
lending facilities to be established pursuant to its authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.25 These facilities had the effect of
providing massive liquidity support to the financial system and reversed an unprecedented liquidity disruption that was unfolding the
week of March 16.26 These measures were later supplemented by additional credit facilities, such as the Primary Market Corporate Credit
Facility and the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, and by
other funding and programs authorized under the CARES Act.27
There are various possible explanations for the exceptional and
swift nature of the financial response. Likely, the independent and centralized authority of the Federal Reserve, the quick legislative grant of
funding and authority to support the facilities,28 and experience from
Extending the Eviction Moratorium (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021
/s0121-eviction-moratorium.html [https://perma.cc/5YA6-SKU5]. One court has held that the CDC
exceeded the federal governments constitutional power in issuing the moratorium. Terkel v. Ctrs.
for Disease Control and Prevention, No. 6:20-CV-00564, 2021 WL 742877, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25,
2021), appeal filed, No. 21-40137 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2021). An appeal of that case is currently pending.
25
The three facilities were the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, the Primary
Dealer Credit Facility, and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility. Press Release, Fed. Rsrv.,
Federal Reserve Board Announces Establishment of a Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) to
Support the Credit Needs of Households and Businesses (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200317b.htm
[https://perma.cc/7L6G-RY86];
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, FED. RSRV., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mmlf.htm [https://perma.cc/99JU-FRCK] (last updated May 10, 2021); Press Release,
Fed. Rsrv., Federal Reserve Board Announces Establishment of a Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to Support the Flow of Credit to Households and Businesses (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200317a.htm
[https://perma.cc/JV8T-RXFK]; Justin Muzinich, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Remarks at the 2020 U.S. Treasury Market Conference (Sep. 29, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov
/news/press-releases/sm1138 [https://perma.cc/RX53-QSBV]; see also Lorie K. Logan, Executive
Vice President, Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., Speech on Treasury Market Liquidity and Early Lessons
from the Pandemic Shock (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents
/speeches/2020/log201023 [https://perma.cc/RXF3-9CKK].
26
See Muzinich, supra note 25.
27
See Thomas Wade, Timeline: The Federal Reserve Responds to the Threat of Coronavirus,
AM. ACTION F. (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/timeline-the-federalreserve-responds-to-the-threat-of-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/BRS7-ND8Y]. For a brief overview of the Federal Reserve’s activities with regards to its outstanding lending facilities, see FED.
RSRV., PERIODIC REPORT: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE
BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/pdcf-mmlf-cpff-pmccf-smccf-talf-mlf-ppplf-msnlf-mself-msplf-nonlf-noelf-01-11-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT8T-XKHN].
28
The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury noted, “[I]t is reassuring to know that faced with the
first significant shock since the Dodd-Frank reforms, policy makers were able to act swiftly and
forcefully to produce a bipartisan and successful result.” Muzinich, supra note 25.
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the 2008 financial crisis all played a role. It is also possible that major
financial players were organized to quickly advise (or lobby) the government on cohesive responses, or that the relative opacity of financial
measures shields them from the controversy and political bickering that
plague measures such as direct payments to individuals.
The comparative success of the Federal Reserve in implementing
financial relief as compared to purely legislative measures is consistent
with the idea—which I argued for after the 2008 financial crisis—that
financial bailouts are best accomplished outside the legislative process:
“Generally speaking, a regulator [as opposed to the legislature] should
engage in bailouts for the same reason that regulators typically engage
in executive action—they can act more quickly and flexibly than Congress can, and are less likely to be influenced by irrelevant political factors.”29
Notable in all of this is that bankruptcy provisions were almost
nonexistent. Most bankruptcy experts thought bankruptcy law and
bankruptcy courts would play a large role in dealing with the economic
effects of the pandemic.30 There were broad calls for bankruptcy relief
measures and a worry that without such measures catastrophe could
hit. Indeed, in the bankruptcy context, a consensus had emerged on one
prediction: an unprecedented wave of Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases was
on its way.31

29

Anthony Casey & Eric Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 479, 533–34 (2015).
30
See infra note 31.
31
See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, A Tidal Wave of Bankruptcies is Coming, N.Y. TIMES (June
18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/business/corporate-bankruptcy-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/82XG-PFE6]; Iverson et al., supra note 9; Letter from Jared A. Ellias (June 10,
2020), supra note 15; Jared A. Ellias & George Triantis, Congress Is Ignoring the Best Solution For
Troubled Companies: Bankruptcy, FORTUNE (May 14, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/05/14/bankruptcy-cares-act-aid-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/4XA5-Y3B9]; Geoff Colvin, Pandemic Fallout
Is About to Overwhelm the Bankruptcy System—And Hit Small Businesses Hardest, FORTUNE
(Nov. 24, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/11/24/bankruptcy-covid-economy-small-business/
[https://perma.cc/K8BK-5P62]; Dina Gerdeman, Coronavirus Could Create a ‘Bankruptcy Pandemic’, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (May 28, 2020), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/coronavirus-could-create-a-bankruptcy-pandemic [https://perma.cc/X2AV-8PAY]. Some expressed
doubt about the size of the wave. See Phil Ciciora, What Effect Will COVID-19 Have on Consumer
Bankruptcies?, ILL. NEWS BUREAU (Apr. 29, 2020), https://news.illinois.edu/view/6367/808303
[https://perma.cc/EF4Z-AY53] (interviewing Professor Robert M. Lawless); Mark Henricks &
Daphne Foreman, After the Covid-19 Deluge, a Bankruptcy Tidal Wave?, FORBES (Sep. 23, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2020/09/23/after-the-covid-19-deluge-a-bankruptcy-tidalwave/?sh=2980d49f4aba [https://perma.cc/5MLG-8HKT] (quoting Professor Lawless); David
Skeel, Bankruptcy and the Coronavirus: Part II, ECON. STUD. AT BROOKINGS (July 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ES-6.6.20-Skeel-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XT99-USJC]. But the vast majority of experts were predicting the wave.
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To respond to this deluge, some called for the appointment of more
bankruptcy judges and the funding of other resources.32 Others proposed various measures that would change bankruptcy rules, such as a
program of “pre-packaged bankruptcies for small firms,”33 the extension
of various deadlines for certain payments and actions by debtor,34 or
measures to provide funding to debtors, such as the creation of a government financed Debtor-in-Possession Financing Facility.35
In the end, the only provisions in the CARES Act related to bankruptcy were a provision temporarily expanding eligibility for small business proceedings intended to ease bankruptcy,36 a provision temporarily excluding relief payments from income for individuals in Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceedings,37 and a provision temporarily allowing individuals to request a modification to a Chapter 13 plan if they experienced hardship related to the pandemic.38 The Act also had the highly
criticized effect of denying PPP funds to firms in bankruptcy.39
Subsequent relief legislation in 2020 had a similar whack-a-mole
feel to it. The December legislation included additional individual stimulus payments that once again excluded adult dependents, a few small
bankruptcy provisions,40 and additional PPP funding that may or may
not be available to firms in bankruptcy.41
Given the dynamics discussed above, it is not surprising that the
financial crisis has so far been averted while the economic crisis remains. There has not been a liquidity crisis, nor has there been any real
lack of capital available to businesses. The same cannot be said of the
economic situation. Small business revenues have declined across all
industries with variations in severity. Estimates suggest that small
32

9.

33

Letter from Jared A. Ellias (June 10, 2020), supra note 15; see also Iverson et al., supra note

Greenwood et al., supra note 9.
Letter from Brook Gotberg, supra note 15.
35
See Peter DeMarzo et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing Facility (DIPFF) Proposal (June
20,
2020),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication-pdf/dipff.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37JU-RNEY].
36
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, Sec.
1113; 11 U.S.C. § 1182, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
37
Id. at Sec. 1113; 11 U.S.C. § 1325, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
38
Id. at Sec. 1113; 11 U.S.C. § 1329, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
39
Supra note 22.
40
In separate legislation, Congress extended existing bankruptcy judgeships and enacted minor changes to the distribution of bankruptcy fees to the United States Trustee. Bankruptcy Administration Improvement Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-325, 134 Stat. 5086 (2021). This does not
represent an expansion of the bankruptcy bench. Rather it is just a continuation of the pre-pandemic status quo—a far cry from adding dozens or hundreds of new judges that some called for—
and it likely would have happened regardless of the crisis.
41
Supra note 22. Notably, the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 contained $1.9 trillion in
broader relief especially for individuals.
34
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business revenues declined between 30 percent and 70 percent in large
cities;42 still other figures indicate that by mid-April 2020, revenue for
a typical small business engaged in personal services had declined over
80 percent.43
Perhaps most surprising, though, is how wrong the bankruptcy
predictions have been. The wave never materialized.44 Despite the
widespread economic distress, bankruptcy filings have not swelled to
anything like what was predicted, and courts have not been overwhelmed. The rate of bankruptcy filings for small businesses (and individuals) has actually fallen quite dramatically, and the rate of large
corporate bankruptcies—while it has increased—has not reached anywhere near a level that would cripple bankruptcy courts.45 To be sure,
we are still in the midst of the pandemic, and a day of economic reckoning is on the horizon. But it is less clear today that this reckoning will
take place in bankruptcy courtrooms. This distinguishes 2020 from
2008, which—despite massive government bailouts and subsidies—saw
a steep increase in bankruptcy filings.46
Part of this might be explained by interventions such as the PPP.
But many of the predictions in April and May had already factored
those programs into the analysis. There is likely more to the story, and
42

Scholars examining the differential impact of the crisis in affluent and economically depressed regions found that “[s]mall business revenues in the highest-income and highest-rent ZIP
codes . . . fell by more than 65% between March and mid-April, compared with 30% in the least
affluent ZIP codes.” Raj Chetty et al., The Economic Impacts of COVID-19: Evidence from a New
Public Database Built from Private Sector Data 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
27431, 2020).
43
Small Business Financial Outcomes During the Onset of COVID-19, JPMORGAN CHASE
(June 2020), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/research/small-business/small-business-financial-outcomes-during-the-onset-of-covid-19#finding-3 [https://perma.cc/D269-P3ZW].
44
While commercial bankruptcies were up 29 percent in 2020, individual bankruptcy filings
plummeted. In total, bankruptcy filings in 2020 actually experienced one of the largest drops in
history, falling 30 percent compared to 2019. Press Release, Am. Bankr. Inst., Total Bankruptcy
Filings Drop 30 Percent in Calendar Year 2020, Commercial Chapter 11s Up 29 Percent (Jan. 6,
2021), https://www.abi.org/newsroom/press-releases/total-bankruptcy-filings-drop-30-percent-incalendar-year-2020-commercial [https://perma.cc/HXJ3-EHHN].
45
Rachel Layne, COVID Was Supposed to Increase Bankruptcies. Instead, They’ve Gone Down,
HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 23, 2020), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/covid-wassupposed-to-increase-bankruptcies-instead-theyve-gone-down [https://perma.cc/EHE7-VQSZ] (asserting that the increase in Chapter 11 filings was driven by corporations with more than $50
million in assets; filings for small businesses during this same period actually dropped); see also
Annual Bankruptcy Filings Fall 29.7 Percent, U.S. COURTS (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2021/01/28/annual-bankruptcy-filings-fall-297-percent
[https://perma.cc/5NBL-QU74] (“Bankruptcy filings fell sharply for the 12-month period ending
Dec. 31, 2020. . . . Only one category saw an increase in filings. Chapter 11 reorganizations rose
18.7 percent . . . .”).
46
During the 2008 crisis, business bankruptcies increased by 54 percent (with public company
bankruptcies up 74 percent), and total bankruptcy filings increased 31 percent, from 850,912 total
filings in 2007 to 1,117,771 filings in 2008. US Bankruptcy Filings Up 31 Pct in 2008-Court Data,
REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-bankruptcy-filings/us-bankruptcyfilings-up-31-pct-in-2008-court-data-idUSN0533332920090305 [https://perma.cc/CL5D-JVBJ].

63]

BANKRUPTCY & BAILOUTS, SUBSIDIES & STIMULUS

73

it may have to do with a misunderstanding of the exact challenges that
a global pandemic presents and what—if anything—the bankruptcy
system can do to address those challenges (more on this in Part II). Indeed, part of the story is that we—bankruptcy lawyers and scholars47—
had lost sight for a moment of the real limitations of corporate bankruptcy law and the distinction between financial and economic distress.
The fact that bankruptcy courts were not hit by a torrent of filings
does not, however, mean there wasn’t great distress. Unemployment
numbers skyrocketed and then vacillated throughout the year, and
small businesses were decimated. We should find no comfort in the absence of a wave.
II. THE FRAMEWORK
To choose the appropriate form of government intervention in response to market distress resulting from a crisis or disaster, one must
determine the nature of the distress and the purpose for the intervention. Markets might be faced with a banking crisis—as they were in
2008—that threatens financial liquidity, or an economic crisis that
could leave over twenty million people unemployed as in 2020.48 The
appropriate response will be different for each type of distress posed by
a crisis.
In identifying the nature of market distress, the distress can be
classified across two dimensions. First, the distress can be economic or
financial. Second, it can be systemic or specific. These dimensions prescribe the appropriate response. A government’s goals and the tools to
achieve those goals will be very different when the government is responding to specific distress as compared to when it is responding to
systemic distress. Similarly, the tools appropriate to relieve financial
distress are very different from those appropriate to relieve economic

47

I must count myself in this group as I too signed a letter urging an expansion of the bankruptcy bench. Letter from Jared A. Ellias (June 10, 2020), supra note 15. In retrospect, that letter
was premature and, for the reasons discussed in this article, the proposed remedy has proven to
be unnecessary. A few scholars expressed mild skepticism. See Skeel, supra note 31; Ciciora, supra
note 31; Henricks, supra note 31. Interestingly, the one group that seemed least worried about the
wave was the bankruptcy judges themselves. During conversations and panels, I have heard many
bankruptcy judges note that they are not particularly concerned about a crippling wave of cases
and some strongly reject the idea that more judges should be appointed.
48
In April 2020 the number of unemployed persons in the United States increased by 15.9
million to reach 23.1 million unemployed. Employment Situation—April 2020, supra note 13. Although this figure had decreased to 10.7 million unemployed by December 2020, this figure is nearly
twice the pre-pandemic level of unemployment in February 2020. Employment Situation—December 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_01082021.htm [https://perma.cc/2XFE-3H2S].
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distress. For example, bankruptcy law is a tool not well suited to resolving systemic financial distress or any form of economic distress.49
In this Part, I first examine the dimensions of distress. From there,
I present each toolset and its suitability for the relevant category of distress.
A. Catgories and Dimensions of Market Distress
1. Economic vs. financial
Economic and financial distress are two distinct problems.50 The
distinction is familiar to bankruptcy lawyers.51
Economic distress occurs when a firm struggles in the marketplace.
The core problem is usually that the firm can no longer sell its goods or
services at a price that justifies the cost of producing them. Demand for
the firm’s product may fall for various reasons including new competition, failed marketing campaigns, and shifts in consumer preferences.
Or the firm’s cost of producing the goods may rise for reasons including
shortages in the supply of production inputs, increases in the cost of
labor, and failed operations. As we will see, such shifts in demand and
production costs may also result from an exogenous shock like the
COVID-19 pandemic.52
In contrast, financial distress occurs when a firm struggles with its
capital structures. The core problem here is usually that the firm is burdened by its past debts and cannot finance new projects, even when
those projects are profitable. Financial distress can exist even when a
firm is economically sound. There may be demand for its products at
prices that exceed the cost of production, but the firm cannot borrow
money to finance the projects because of its prior debts. This problem—
known as debt overhang—arises because the existing creditors already
have claims on revenue that will come from the future project or because the markets are not liquid enough to provide financing for the
project.53

49

See discussion infra Section II.B.4 (Bankruptcy proceedings for specific financial distress).
Economic and financial distress can occur simultaneously and often one can cause the other.
But they need not be coupled, and even when they are each type calls for a distinct government
response.
51
BARRY E. ADLER ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 27 (3d ed. 2000)
(“Understanding that financial and economic distress are conceptually distinct from each other is
fundamental to understanding Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
52
The effects of the pandemic might manifest in direct changes to consumer preferences or in
government ordered changes to consumption or supply.
53
See generally Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469
(2010) (explaining debt overhang and market liquidity as causes of financial distress).
50
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2. Specific vs. systemic
Some forms of distress are specific to one firm, while other forms
are systemic in that they threaten to spread throughout the economic
or financial system. When a single firm fails because its products are
inferior, that is an example of specific economic distress. Similarly, if a
single firm cannot finance its operations because it took on too much
debt, that is an example of specific financial distress. Notably, specific
distress—economic or financial—is not a crisis in the sense that the
harm is not spreading.
Systemic distress, on the other hand, can be thought of as distress
that can spread and produce macroeconomic costs.54 Systemic financial
distress occurs when the distress of financial institutions is spreading
from firm to firm and ultimately into the real economy. Likewise, systemic economic distress occurs when one firm’s economic collapse
threatens the viability of other firms. The key is that distress is spreading.
Because it is spreading, any systemic crisis will likely present with
both economic and financial distress. That is to say, financial distress
can lead to economic distress—as it did in 2008—and economic distress
can lead to financial distress—as many worried it would during the pandemic.55 But the relative severity and importance of addressing each
type will differ across crises.
It is also worth noting that systemic distress is distinct from specific distress that is merely common. Specific distress can afflict many
firms without actively spreading. This can occur, for example, in the
wake of a disaster or crisis that has run its course where many firms
are in distress, but the distress is contained. Conversely, the distress of
one large firm might be systemic if it threatens to spread because of the
importance or size of that firm.
B. Appropriate Tools for Each Category
We can thus analyze market distress to which government action
might be targeted in four categories, each of which is best addressed by
a particular type of government action. Targeted subsidies are for specific economic distress;56 general stimulus programs are the toolset for

54

Casey & Posner, supra note 29, at 523.
Muzinich, supra note 25 (“The 2008 crisis had moved from Wall Street to Main Street. This
crisis, on the other hand, started with Main Street businesses shutting down as required by the
pandemic, and the concern the week of March 16 became that a financial market crisis would also
develop, creating further instability for so many Main Street businesses that rely on financing.”).
56
This category may be properly understood as a form of humanitarian relief or political favoritism rather than a crisis response. See Casey & Posner, supra note 29, at 490 n.47.
55
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systemic economic crisis;57 bailouts are for systemic financial crisis; and
bankruptcy proceedings are for specific financial distress. (See Table 1
from the introduction.) This subpart explains the connection between
each category and the appropriate type of government actions.
1.

Subsidies for specific economic distress

Subsidies are transfers, often in the form of loans or direct payments, to alleviate the economic distress of a particular individual, firm,
or industry.58 These transfers may be attempts to provide humanitarian
relief to individuals or to save a particular firm or industry from failure,
often for political or moral reasons.59 They are not intended to stop the
spread of distress but rather to relieve or reverse distress that has already occurred. In this way, they are the appropriate tool for responding
to specific economic distress.
Because specific economic distress is not spreading, the relevant
considerations for a proper government response are different from
those discussed below for systemic distress. Individual businesses fail
all the time, but there are no efficiency arguments supporting direct
government intervention to reverse the contained economic failure of
one business or industry. When governments provide humanitarian relief to alleviate the harsh effects of unforeseen events or abrupt economic transitions or to save a particular firm or industry from failure,

57

“Bail-ins” proposed by Van Zwieten et al. would also fall in this category. See infra note 94.
These can be thought of as government mandated private stimulus. See also Zachary Liscow,
Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (2014).
58
One might alternatively call these payments “direct relief.” That term may imply some
moral desert and seems particularly appropriate where the payments go to individuals where
moral considerations argue in their favor. But with failing firms and businesses, a transfer to
prevent that failure is a subsidy and economically indistinguishable from a subsidy in any other
context.
59
Casey & Posner, supra note 29, at 490, 505. Professor Dauber has demonstrated that relief
payments to disaster sufferers are a longstanding feature of American legal and political history.
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 is one prominent example of relief packages throughout American history. Direct compensation has been provided since the founding days
of the Republic, including through a Claims Commission following the War of 1812, as well as
statutory relief for victims of an 1827 Virginia fire and victims of the Whiskey Rebellion. Moreover,
“between 1860 and 1930 alone, there were more than ninety separate relief measures for various
fires, floods, droughts, and famines.” These measures included millions expended for southern relief after the Civil War. Dauber, infra note 60, at 290–95; see also MICHELE L. DAUBER, THE
SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE
(2012).
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the argument for such relief rests instead on moral grounds60 or political considerations (or lobbying).61
The moral and political considerations at play when providing such
relief are not much different in a pandemic than they are in other contexts. The moral questions about who deserves relief and the risks of
political abuse in granting that relief are much the same after this pandemic as they were after prior disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, fires, the terrorist attacks of September 11, and even the War of
1812 and the Whiskey Rebellion.62
Still, one fact might distinguish the political and moral calculus
here. Few events in recent history have had such a direct effect on so
many people around the world. It is not clear which way that cuts. On
the one hand, ubiquity may create a strong political appetite for relief.
On the other hand, it may spark especially vigorous objections to any
relief targeted at specific firms or industries, especially if those firms or
industries are viewed as political favorites.63
2.

Stimulus for systemic economic distress

In some cases, economic distress can be systemic. These cases often
call for transfers intended to stimulate systemic economic activity. Because these transfers are intended to jump-start economic activity and
stop the spread of economic distress, they usually should be targeted at
a broad market or industry rather than at specific firms or individuals.
And the argument for using broad measures (directed at all small and

60

See Michele L. Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of Compensation,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 289, 354 (2013) (discussing the “moral economy” involved in such transfers
which often “requires that claimants represent themselves as blameless victims of forces entirely
beyond their own control”).
61
Airlines have been particularly successful at this type of lobbying, receiving special relief
after the terrorist attacks of September 11 and during the pandemic. Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 367, 367–70 (2003); see also
Jonathan Lewinsohn, Note, Bailing Out Congress: An Assessment and Defense of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, 115 YALE L.J. 438, 457 (2005) (“The ultimate goal of the ATSSSA was to avoid the symbolic cataclysm of multiple carriers declaring bankruptcy a short time after September 11.”); Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 101(a)(2), 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)). Consistent with this trend, the airline industry secured billions in a bailout and loan package in the
initial months of the pandemic. Alan Rappeport & Niraj Chokshi, Crippled Airline Industry to Get
$25 Billion Bailout, Part of It as Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/04/14/business/coronavirus-airlines-bailout-treasury-department.html [https://perma.cc/G7YF7UZ9].
62
Dauber, supra note 60.
63
Of course, all disaster relief measures prompt some fairness objections. See id. at 347 (quoting a woman objecting to relief after September 11 for treating those victims differently from victims of natural disasters and asking, “[W]hy do those people deserve to become millionaires more
th[a]n any other surviving family member of any other disaster?”). Those objections might be
louder when virtually everyone has some grounds to claim entitlement to relief.
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medium businesses) rather than targeted measures is even stronger
during a pandemic.
The systemic costs of economic distress are most obvious when the
effects of a single firm’s or industry’s64 shutdown spreads broadly to
other businesses and consumers, ultimately causing the failure of otherwise economically viable firms. If markets function perfectly, firms
with economic value will survive the failure of firms without economic
value, and there will be no social costs. But when transition costs are
high and it is difficult to differentiate good from bad firms, and when
markets are slow to adjust to changes in aggregate supply and demand,
economic distress may spread and create system-wide deadweight
loss.65 In that case, it may be in everyone’s interest to prevent the first
domino from falling or to stop the spread as soon as possible when the
market does not produce the necessary coordination to do so on its
own.66
This coordination problem and the spread of economic distress are
particularly likely to accompany a global pandemic, but with added
complications. Given the scope, speed, and variation of the economic
shocks produced by the pandemic, efficient market adjustments and coordination were impossible. In March and April, certain industries experienced an abrupt and severe reduction in demand for their goods and
services across all firms. Consumers stopped paying to fly on planes,
stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, and go to movie theaters or fitness
centers. In light of the rapidly changing circumstances, it would have
been naïve to expect markets to swiftly and costlessly adjust. Instead,
the market produced dramatic business closings and record-setting unemployment.
Responding to such a shock is complicated in part because many
conventional government policies won’t work in a pandemic setting. For
instance, in a non-pandemic economic crisis, the government might provide direct stimulus funding to jump-start economic activity. If reduced
demand for restaurants poses systemic economic risk—because restaurant failures lead to food distributor failures, which lead to catering failures, and so on—the government might provide stimulus funds directly

64

In reality, few economic firms are large enough to qualify as that “first domino.” But certainly, if an entire industry or community shut down, the risk of systemic spread would be real.
65
For a fuller but accessible treatment of these macroeconomic concepts and how they relate
to law, see Yair Listokin, A Theoretical Framework for Law and Macroeconomics, 21 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 46 (2019).
66
Id. at 47 (noting that a recession produced by inadequate aggregate demand “represents a
coordination failure”); see also N. Gregory Mankiw, New Keynesian Economics, CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON., http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NewKeynesianEconomics.html
[https://perma.cc/V9GF-2FMB].
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to the restaurant industry or to potential diners. The first solution allows the restaurants to cover their production costs and lower prices.
The second allows the diners to offset some of the price and dine more.
Either way, the result is an increase in economic activity for the restaurants.
That approach would fail in a pandemic. If restaurants are closed
because of a government order or because of consumer precautions, payments to stimulate dining will either fail or—even worse—work against
public health policy. There is no sense in giving diners money to spend
at restaurants that cannot open. And while a transfer to a restaurant
may save that restaurant, it won’t stop the systemic spread if the restaurant doesn’t have any reason to spend the money on supplies or
workers. For that reason, the government action would need to be
broader, directed at the restaurants and all their suppliers as well as
all other systemically affected industries.67
A further complication arises because of the temporal nature of the
pandemic. It may be that the restaurants’ suppliers can survive while
the restaurants are shut down but only as long as the restaurants are
expected to return after the pandemic. In those cases, the key to stemming the spread of systemic distress is not spurring on economic activity, but rather preserving the restaurants as going concerns until the
pandemic recedes. This is done not for the sake of the restaurants, but
for the sake of those other businesses who depend on the existence of
the restaurants.
This problem arises because the permanent closures of restaurants
have ripple effects. As restaurants shut down, food distributors, landlords, and workers now have to redeploy their resources in the economy.68 Food distributors may adapt their businesses to produce for new
markets. That adaptation is costly to do (and undo). Or they may shut
down. And so the result of the restaurant closure might be the waste of
these switching costs, or the restaurants and the food distributors might
be lost for good.
Similarly, employees who are laid off will incur costs in adjusting
to new labor markets. In the depth of the pandemic, Amazon may go on
an unprecedented hiring spree—because its services are in more demand—providing jobs for unemployed restaurant workers.69 But
67

Alternatively, the government might require the restaurant to spend the money on supplies
(and employees) it doesn’t need or use. This is obviously wasteful but could be cost justified if it
resulted in significant savings in the cost of administering the program.
68
Firms may also default on bank loans causing systemic economic distress to spread into the
financial sector. This might cause liquidity issues to spread.
69
Karen Weise, Pushed by Pandemic, Amazon Goes on a Hiring Spree Without Equal, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/27/technology/pushed-by-pandemic-amazon-goes-on-a-hiring-spree-without-equal.html [https://perma.cc/73Q9-FHV5].
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matching and training those workers to new jobs is costly and does not
happen overnight. And, of course, Amazon may then let all of those
workers go when the pandemic ends.
As another example of spreading distress, consider a fitness center
that is shut down by the pandemic. Like the restaurant, it has employees and suppliers who will be affected by the shutdown. But there are
broader effects as well. The health food store and drive-through coffeeshop located next to the fitness center may be able to remain open,
but they will still lose their customer base as the traffic to the fitness
center disappears. During the pandemic these adjacent businesses may,
themselves, need direct stimulus to survive. But that stimulus alone is
not enough; they also need an assurance that the fitness center will be
back (or will be replaced by a new fitness center) at the end of the pandemic. Without that assurance, the adjacent businesses may also be
forced to close down for good. The government might, therefore, reduce
social waste by propping up fitness centers to ensure that coffeeshops
and health food stores don’t collapse.
At the core, these are all problems about coordination and transition costs. If it is costless to shut down the old gyms (and coffeeshops
and health food stores) when the pandemic begins and costless to open
up new ones when it ends, then these temporal complications don’t matter. Or if the costs are small enough, the government can simply let
them fail and then provide stimulus to new replacement businesses after the pandemic is over. But if the costs of transition—including shutdown, reallocation of capital and labor, and rebuilding—exceed the
costs of government-funded preservation, then preservation is the better course of action.
This comparative analysis can quickly favor preservation when
there is a likelihood that distress will spread. If preserving the restaurant industry also preserves the vendors, landlords, and banks that do
business with that industry, the expense of maintaining one business
might eliminate the transition costs for five more. When that is true,
government intervention on behalf of the restaurants looks even more
economically attractive.
These calculations are, however, difficult, and again the pandemic
context adds complications and uncertainties, three of which I highlight
here. First, unlike the economic distress of a failed firm or industry that
has outlived its usefulness (think the horse and buggy industry in the
early twentieth century), the economic distress that arises in a pandemic will be temporary for many industries. But no one can know its
exact duration.
That muddies the water. The appropriate allocation of economic resources for a pandemic that lasts three months might be quite different
from the allocation appropriate for one that lasts over a year. And so,
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the social cost of providing stimulus funds to maintain the existing allocation relative to the social cost of letting market reallocation play out
will depend in large part on what one expects the economy to look like
next year. If firms shut down and three months later the demand for
their products rebounds, the consumption of resources in shutting them
down and then bringing them back is a waste. But what if they won’t
be back for three years?
Somewhat counterintuitively, the longer one thinks the pandemic
will last, the weaker the argument is for systemic economic relief. The
cost of preserving a business goes up relative to shut down and
(re)startup costs as the period of distress increases. It may make economic sense to prop up a dormant restaurant or fitness center for ten
months, but not for five years. (On the other hand, the humanitarian
argument for specific relief may move in the opposite direction.)
Second, for some firms and industries, there is uncertainty about
whether demand will ever recover. That is, some markets may be permanently altered, while others may not. It hardly makes sense to preserve the movie theater industry as it is if demand for movies in theaters will never fully return to pre-pandemic levels. But until the
pandemic ends, one might not be able to distinguish permanent from
temporary changes in these markets.
Finally, it may be difficult to differentiate firms and industries that
are casualties of the pandemic from those that would have collapsed in
the normal course of business.
These uncertainties make it difficult for markets to adjust to the
shock of a pandemic. They also present a daunting challenge to governments considering intervention. In some instances—where more firms
are expected to be viable after the pandemic and the cost of distinguishing good firms from bad firms is high—the best action may be to keep
all firms alive until the pandemic is over. The question is a difficult one
of how the expected costs of preserving all dormant businesses compare
to the costs of shutting down and restarting (or sometimes altogether
losing) the viable businesses. If it is too costly or impossible to answer
this question, a government actor might take a blunt market-wide or
industry-wide approach to stimulus and do the reckoning when the dust
settles.
As a final matter, it is worth noting that systemic economic distress
in a pandemic and the various complications discussed are especially
acute problems for small and medium businesses. When a local coffeeshop or restaurant cannot pay its debts because its revenues have
dried up and its fixed costs remain, there are only two paths forward.
Either the creditors forbear—recognizing that there is no other use for
these assets while the economy is on pause—or they shut the business
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down. Other tools like bankruptcy proceedings have little or no role to
play here and cannot alter these two paths (more on this later).
The same is not true for most large businesses. The level of uncertainty is not the same. One does not doubt that the major airlines will
return to some level of business after the pandemic or that McDonald’s
and Starbucks will continue to exist. Perhaps those firms will incur new
debts to weather the storm, and they may have to reorganize their capital structures or even go through bankruptcy and change ownership,
but one is reasonably sure that most of their assets will still be valuably
deployed as part of their existing enterprises.
All this suggests that the government has a particular role to play
in reducing systemic economic distress for small and medium businesses. To foreshadow later discussion, the appropriate tool for this action is emphatically not bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law cannot create
new economic demand, and it cannot pay the employees of a restaurant
that is shut down.70 Likewise, it cannot solve systemic problems because it functions in only one small corner of the system.71 Similarly,
other proposals that are narrowly targeted or require ad hoc judicial
processes are unlikely to provide the necessary systemic relief. Standstill agreements or creditor haircuts provide specific relief to certain
firms in financial distress who are worried about prior debts, but they
don’t go very far in paying the current costs of maintaining a business
through a shut down that has lasted for almost a year. Rather, systemic
economic distress should be met with a broad and general stimulus program for small and medium businesses.
Looking at what the government actually did in 2020, the PPP was
in a sense appropriate as a broad transfer to small businesses, but a
broader and more organized relief program would have been better.72
70

Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 102 (1984) [hereinafter Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Interests] (“The problems brought by business failures are
not bankruptcy problems.”); see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY:
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 27 (3d ed. 2001) (“The legal system can do nothing to solve the
problem of economic distress . . . . Laws can do nothing to transform bad restaurants into good
ones.”).
71
Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests, supra note 70, at 102 (“A bankruptcy proceeding should not be the place to implement a
policy that society does not enforce outside of bankruptcy and that is unrelated to the preservation
of assets for the firm’s investor group. Most businesses fail without a bankruptcy petition ever
being filed.”). Professor Liscow questions this argument, though his analysis does not show that
bankruptcy judges have the tools necessary to make firm-specific decisions based on broad macroeconomic calculations. See Liscow, supra note 57.
72
Although the PPP has succeeded to some degree in preserving jobs and businesses, there
remains significant disagreement as to the program’s efficiency and efficacy. David Autor and David Cho found that the PPP increased aggregate employment by 1.4 million to 3.2 million jobs
through the first week of June 2020. David Autor et al., An Evaluation of the Paycheck Protection
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As to the other forms of systemic economic relief in the CARES Act, they
were at best disorganized tinkering at the edges and at worst blatant
political favoritism.
Consider, for example, the funds provided to the airline industry.73
The airlines were not at risk of being dismantled. It is true that many
airlines were in financial distress.74 Without relief it was possible that
some would have filed for bankruptcy and or ended up being owned by
their creditors. But none of that poses an obvious macroeconomic concern. Nor was the relief structured to prevent systemic spread or protect
adjacent industries. And to the extent the transfers were intended as
relief for airline employees, direct payments would have been a more
efficient and effective way to achieve that end.
As for the government payments to individuals, they might be defensible as specific relief,75 but in terms of systemic distress they provided no help to the small businesses that were shutting down. Individual stimulus is a consumer-focused program, but the systemic problem
in this crisis was at the small and medium business level. Indeed, to the
extent payments to individuals in 2020 stimulated aggregate demand—
usually what you want from a stimulus program—they were misdirected because they would have only stimulated demand for products
from the wrong firms, those that were not being shut down because of
the pandemic risk.76
Program Using Administrative Payroll Microdata (2020) (preliminary draft), https://economics.mit.edu/files/20094 [https://perma.cc/Q52J-XRR8]. These modest findings have led some economists to argue that the PPP is an inefficient use of funds. Ben Casselman & Jim Tankersley, $500
Billion in Aid to Small Businesses: How Much Did It Help?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/business/economy/ppp-jobs-small-business.html
[https://perma.cc/7N3M-YMZ8]. By contrast, other economists argue that the PPP was beneficial
insofar as it saved small businesses in disadvantaged regions. Indeed, a study utilizing survey
data from businesses in Oakland, California, estimated that the PPP increased medium-run survival probability by 20.5 percent, although only for microbusinesses. Robert P. Bartlett III & Adair
Morse, Small Business Survival Capabilities and Policy Effectiveness: Evidence from Oakland
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27629, 2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files
/working_papers/w27629/w27629.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6QM-HAUN]; see also Beylin, supra note
19.
73
Richard Squire, Opinion: U.S. Airlines Don’t Need a Bailout to Stay in Business, WASH.
POST (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/22/us-airlines-dontneed-bailout-stay-business/ [https://perma.cc/WV8P-DCYT]; Anthony Casey, Large Corporations
Did Not Need a Bailout, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 14, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu
/2020/04/14/large-corporations-did-not-need-a-bailout/ [https://perma.cc/W7H9-4HR6].
74
David Schaper, United Airlines Reports $1.8 Billion Loss but Looks Ahead to Friendlier
Skies, NPR (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/10/15
/924225784/united-airlines-reports-1-8-billion-loss-but-looks-ahead-to-friendlier-skies
[https://perma.cc/8D8C-TKUF].
75
While the payments may have been justified on independent grounds as relief for the specific economic distress of those receiving it, it is odd that the payment program excluded those
most in need of relief. See discussion supra note 18.
76
It is also possible that stimulus payments even posed a risk of encouraging consumers to
spend money on activities we do not want them to engage in during the pandemic. This might
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Other measures like the eviction moratoria were certainly important, but none was sufficiently broad to address the full problem that
an enormous number of small and medium businesses have closed their
doors and will not be here when the pandemic is over.77
3.

Bailouts for systemic financial distress

Like economic distress, financial distress can be systemic or specific. Systemic financial distress occurs when, because of the interconnected nature of financial systems, distress at financial firms spreads
through the financial system and dries up the capital generally available to firms in the real economy. This shock to liquidity will prevent
those firms from financing their operations. The government’s best response to systemic financial distress is to inject liquidity into the financial system. This injection is a bailout and can take the form of loans,
guarantees, cash, or other transfers to private agents.78
The government’s responses to the financial crisis of 2008 provide
examples of such liquidity injections. As the crisis of 2008 spread and
brought the near collapse of global financial markets, the United States
government responded with massive financial bailout programs largely
administered through the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department. The scope, appropriateness, and efficacy of those programs has
been the subject of much debate and a robust academic literature.79
suggest that we should more directly and deliberately subsidize the activities we want people to
engage in.
77
Exact figures are difficult to calculate, due in part to “lack of timely and granular data on
financial positions” of small and medium sized enterprises in the United States. Pierre-Olivier
Gourinchas et al., COVID-19 and SME Failures 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No.
27877,
2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27877/w27877.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N2AY-59SB]. That said, available estimates demonstrate that there is a significant influx in small business failures due to the impact of COVID-19. See Local Economic Impact
Report, YELP: ECON. AVERAGE (Sept. 2020), https://www.yelpeconomicaverage.com/business-closures-update-sep-2020.html [https://perma.cc/69D2-SK7M] (estimating that 97,966 businesses
had permanently closed between March and September 2020); Robert W. Fairlie, The Impact of
Covid-19 on Small Business Owners: Evidence of Early-Stage Losses from the April 2020 Current
Population Survey (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27309, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27309 [https://perma.cc/X9W3-N4S7] (“The number of active business owners in the United States plummeted by 3.3 million or 22 percent over the crucial twomonth window from February to April 2020.”); Alexander W. Bartik et al., How Are Small Businesses Adjusting to COVID-19? Early Evidence From a Survey 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 26989, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w26989 [https://perma.cc/87W8PLSE] (reporting that in March 2020, 41.4 percent of small business owners had temporarily
closed due to COVID-19, while 1.8 percent reported that they had permanently closed due to the
pandemic).
78
See generally Casey & Posner, supra note 29.
79
Kate Judge, Guarantor of Last Resort, 97 TEX. L. REV. 707 (2019); Kate Judge, The First
Year: The Role of the Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (2016); Iman Anabtawi
& Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial
Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2013); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011);
Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA.
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While most would agree that the Federal Reserve has a central role to
play in responding to a systemic financial crisis,80 there is less agreement on the appropriate structure and rules that should guide its actions.
Because these arguments are already well rehearsed, I will spend
the least time on this category. I have set out my views on this question
elsewhere,81 providing a framework to guide governments in designing
financial bailouts. I noted there that the optimal government agents for
implementing financial bailouts will usually be regulators in the executive branch and that a balance must be struck between considerations
of ex post efficiency, fairness, moral hazard, and administrative costs.82
Fairness and administrative costs can often be in particular tension because the easiest and most direct way to stabilize financial markets is
providing aid to large financial institutions not individuals.
That tension was on display in the 2008 bailouts and the negative
public reaction to the “big bank” or “Wall Street” bailouts.83 The same
tension exists with regard to the current crisis. As the Federal Reserve
acted quickly to set up its 13(3) facilities in response to the pandemic,
again the direct benefits accrued largely to financial institutions. And
there have been some familiar complaints that the program favors Wall
Street over Main Street.84 The additional relief provided directly to individuals may temper some of these fairness complaints, though it is
too soon to know.
As far as ex post efficiency, the financial measures appear to have
been successful. To the extent a financial crisis was looming, it has been
averted. Financial markets appear unscathed, and there has been no

L. REV. 1349 (2011).
80
See generally Tamim Bayoumi et al., Monetary Policy in the New Normal, INT’L MONETARY
FUND (Apr. 2014), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff-Discussion-Notes/Issues/2016/12/31
/Monetary-Policy-in-the-New-Normal-41419 [https://perma.cc/XF68-7FNL].
81
See generally Casey & Posner, supra note 29.
82
Id.
83
See, e.g., Nina Easton, Main Street Turns Against Wall Street, CNN MONEY (Sept. 28, 2008),
https://money.cnn.com/2008/09/26/news/economy/easton_backlash.fortune/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/YZU6-7D2D]; Adam Nagourney, Bracing for a Backlash Over Wall Street
Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/us/politics/16assess.html [https://perma.cc/BV2N-VSQW]; Ross Douthat, The Great Bailout Backlash, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
5,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/opinion/25douthat.html
[https://perma.cc/YQ7A-RMQL].
84
See, e.g., Niv Elis & Sylvan Lane, Anger Mounts after Corporations Tap Small-Business
Relief Funds, HILL (Apr. 20, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/493759-anger-mounts-aftercorporations-tap-small-business-relief-funds [https://perma.cc/KCM3-2VRZ]; Gene Marks, Shame
on Big Banks for Failing to Step up at a Critical Moment: The Covid-19 Pandemic, GUARDIAN (Apr.
8, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/08/big-banks-coronavirus-critical-moment [https://perma.cc/4BXH-8MX7].
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liquidity crisis or lack of capital available to business. Indeed, most reports suggest that capital has been available in abundance.85
One might counter that no financial crisis ever loomed. But the spiraling markets in mid-March suggest that the threat was real.86 The
fact that we will never be sure is good news. The best crisis responses
will appear unnecessary if they stop the spread before it happens.
4.

Bankruptcy proceedings for specific financial distress

Bankruptcy law creates a system of procedures where specific firms
and individuals can seek judicial relief for their specific financial distress. Firm-specific financial distress is a familiar concept to all bankruptcy lawyers and scholars. When a firm has too much debt in its capital structure, it may find itself unable to raise new capital to finance
projects. This can occur even when financial markets are functioning
perfectly.
Bankruptcy law is a system of proceedings designed specifically to
alleviate this problem.87 This is an uncontroversial view that has appeared in casebooks for decades.88 The importance of this point is in its
negative corollary. Bankruptcy law is not a tool for solving economic
distress. Bankruptcy does not solve economic problems—it cannot pay
future bills and cannot create new demand. If a restaurant has no customers, the bankruptcy process will not create new revenue to pay employees or make rent.
This is evident in the fact that many small businesses that try to
use bankruptcy to save their business fail. Indeed, the majority of small
and medium businesses who try to reorganize in Chapter 11 fail and

85

See John Foley, Breakingviews–Big U.S. Banks Keep Their Powder a Bit Too Dry, REUTERS
(Jan.
15,
2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-results-breakingviewsidUSKBN29K29A [https://perma.cc/79P8-2Z5S] (observing that “[b]ig U.S. banks are awash with
capital, trading like it’s the end of days, and raising abundant capital for their clients”); Rachel
McGovern, Record Sum of Dry Powder Ready for Pandemic-Hit Firms, ICG Says, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-08/record-sum-of-dry-powderready-for-pandemic-hit-firms-icg-says [https://perma.cc/9LLV-EZUT]; Can Private-Equity Firms
Turn a Crisis into an Opportunity?, ECONOMIST (May 30, 2020), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/05/30/can-private-equity-firms-turn-a-crisis-into-an-opportunity
[https://perma.cc/VU3R-D73G] (observing that the private equity firm Blackstone has $152 billion
in dry powder).
86
See Imbert, supra note 12; Banerji et al., supra note 12.
87
See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 53 (arguing that bankruptcy is a solution for firms
dealing with debt overhang or other liquidity problems).
88
See, e.g., BAIRD & JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS, supra note
70, at 27.
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end up liquidating.89 Moreover, most economically failing firms do not
even bother with the process and simply shut down.90
It is not so surprising then that small business bankruptcy filings
appear to have decreased since the pandemic began. Small firms will
either fail or survive. Some have already failed and skipped the bankruptcy process because it had nothing to offer them.91 Others are likely
on the brink. Consider a firm that cannot pay its rent. The landlords
may be subject to the eviction moratorium, or they may be waiting
things out because—during the pandemic shutdowns—there is no new
tenant waiting to replace the current one. But the moment the moratorium is lifted or the moment the new tenant materializes, that will
change.
On the other hand, large firm filings have increased.92 Again, this
is not surprising. For these firms, the economic distress is temporary.
It will consume assets and equity value, but the bulk of their assets will
still be available when the pandemic eases. A small restaurant’s creditors may liquidate its assets, while a large airline’s creditors might take
ownership of the firm and downsize by selling a few airplanes, keeping
the bulk of the assets together. The airline resolves its financial distress
by shifting ownership to creditors, and that can be accomplished
through the bankruptcy process.93
Similarly, but less well recognized, bankruptcy law is a particularly
bad tool for systemic distress.94 When distress is spreading through the
89

It is estimated that nearly 60 percent of small business that file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 are ultimately shut down; these filings are alternatively converted to Chapter 7 proceedings
or are dismissed so that liquidation may occur under applicable state law. Edward R. Morrison,
Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, 50 J.L. & ECON. 381, 382 (2007).
90
See Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business
Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310, 2317 (2005) (“Perhaps only ten to fifteen percent of all
failing businesses ever file a bankruptcy petition.”).
91
Despite the sharp increase of small business failures since the onset of COVID-19, there
has been a corresponding decrease of small business bankruptcy filings during this same period.
Compare sources supra note 77, with sources supra note 45.
92
Supra note 45.
93
A more technical way to explain this point is that each firm—big and small—has a set going
concern value. That is the value that is created by keeping its assets together. The going concern
of the large firm will be large in absolute terms. The going concern value of a small firm will be
small. Preserving the business and reorganizing its capital structure costs money. These costs eat
up value. At some point the costs of recovery are greater than the going concern value. When that
happens, the firm will fail. But unlike going concern value, these costs are not necessarily proportional to the size of the firm. Restructuring costs are much higher for small firms than large firms
as measured relative to the firm’s going concern value. Thus, a large firm is more likely to have
enough excess going concern value to cover those costs and avoid true economic distress.
94
Van Zwieten, Eidenmuller and Sussman make a similar point in noting that bankruptcy is
not designed to deal with the “exceptional scale and nature of COVID-19 distress.” Kristin van
Zwieten et al., Bail-outs and Bail-ins Are Better Than Bankruptcy: A Comparative Assessment of
Public Policy Responses to COVID-19 Distress (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working

88

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2021

system, looking for a solution in a decentralized process that addresses
each affected firm separately makes little sense. As a first objection,
bankruptcy law provides a case-by-case system where each judge is focused on one debtor. That judge lacks systemic information and is not
in a position to collect policy inputs on the state of systemic financial
markets.95 And the appropriate remedy for an individual firm is different from the appropriate remedy for the system as a whole.96
Thus, proposals to inject liquidity into the system by providing special loans to bankrupt debtors are flawed.97 Systemic liquidity problems
occur at a macroeconomic level, but bankruptcy is not and has never
been a macroeconomic tool.98 Trying to use it as such would create coordination problems among multiple courts and other policymakers.
To use an analogy to the public health crisis in a pandemic, bankruptcy proceedings are like a doctor treating an individual patient.
While they are crucial to resolving that patient’s issues, they can do
little to address the danger throughout the community. The specific
treatment for an individual patient is distinct from the public health
measures needed to contain the spread of the disease. And the specific
treatment for one firm’s financial distress is distinct from the measures
necessary to stabilize financial markets as a whole. Just as a systemic
health crisis requires coordinated systemic action and not ad hoc individual treatments, a systemic financial crisis requires a coordinated
systemic response.99 The bankruptcy system does not provide that response.
Paper No. 535/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3669541 [https://perma.cc/3NJQ-Z5Y7].
95
But see Liscow, supra note 57.
96
Triantis and Ellias seem to take a different view. Ellias & Triantis, supra note 31 (“Instead
of building a new rescue system that operates outside and exclusive of existing bankruptcy law,
the government should recognize that it already has a set of experts in financial distress in its
bankruptcy judiciary and put that expertise to work.”). To the extent they argue that the bankruptcy system will be an important tool for large firms in specific financial distress, I agree. But
beyond that they seem to suggest that bankruptcy is the core of a systemic response to the economic and financial crisis. That is where our analysis diverges.
97
See Jason Roderick Donaldson et al., Restructuring vs. Bankruptcy (Colum. L. & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 630, 2020), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3710&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/BP7P-KUAV]; Peter DeMarzo et al., supra note 35.
98
But see Liscow, supra note 57, for an argument that bankruptcy court is a good place for
counter cyclical measures. Liscow’s argument is directed more towards unemployment than crisis.
Still, the proposal is undermined by its asymmetry with non-bankruptcy relief, and in a crisis the
institutional and coordination concerns are heightened. A bankruptcy judge sitting in a particular
district will not be great at assessing the full picture. It makes more sense for that to be done by
the executive or legislative branch.
99
Ellias and Triantis use a different analogy and reach a different conclusion. Ellias & Triantis, supra note 31 (“In its strategy to provide relief and stimulus, the government is in effect
offering roadside emergency assistance when the infrastructure and expertise of a hospital is easily accessible.”). This is an apt analogy for the specific patient. But again, it is not clear how the
individual hospital can stop the systemic spread here.
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As a second objection, conditioning systemic aid on the filing of
bankruptcy will only address the problem for firms that have already
started to fail. This often occurs too late in the day to prevent a spread.
And bankruptcy remedies will miss firms that never file for bankruptcy—some because bankruptcy offers no solution to their distress,
some because bankruptcy is too expensive, and some because they are
far beyond saving. In fact, the bulk of the firms in distress never enter
the bankruptcy system. And those that do often do not find the relief
they need. Thus, any measure that tries to use bankruptcy as the point
of entry for systemic relief—such as a provision for automatic funding
or a provision forcing creditors to provide relief to the debtor—will be
too narrow because it will miss most relevant firms.100
As a third objection, relief that is available only in bankruptcy may
corrupt the incentives for filing. This is not a new idea. It has long been
recognized that systemic relief that is only available in bankruptcy
draws firms into bankruptcy that don’t belong there.101 That is particularly worrisome when—as is the case for small businesses—the costs of
bankruptcy are significant. Providing relief outside of bankruptcy allows a business to access that relief without incurring the large costs of
an unnecessary bankruptcy proceeding.
To be clear, for the same reasons, it is also a mistake to go to the
other extreme and condition relief on the absence of a bankruptcy filing
or otherwise exclude bankrupt firms from accessing relief. Systemic relief should be bankruptcy neutral. This was one of the most egregious
oversights in the original CARES Act. Whether or not that oversight
has or will be rectified remains to be seen.102
III. FINAL THOUGHTS ON BANKRUPTCY AS A CASUALTY OF THE
PANDEMIC
The preceding subpart demonstrates that bankruptcy is not an appropriate tool for responding to systemic financial or economic distress.
But a second question remains. Will the bankruptcy system itself be a
casualty of the crisis? This is not a question of how the bankruptcy system can remedy the crisis, but of how the crisis will affect the bankruptcy system. Some have raised doubts about the system’s ability to
continue functioning in its normal way during the crisis.

100

Automatic provisions forcing creditors to take haircuts or provide other “bail-ins” also create
the risk of transmitting the financial distress from debtors to their creditors. This could exacerbate
the problem by moving the systemic risk closer to the core of the financial system.
101
Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of
Diverse Ownership Interests, supra note 71, at 99–101.
102
See sources cited supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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This question arises because systemic financial and economic distress cause individual firms to experience specific financial distress,
and those firms may then file for bankruptcy. During a large crisis, the
number of firms hit by such specific financial distress may increase.
We have seen this to some degree with large firm filings. But those
large firms are not the systemic concern, and the numbers have been
manageable. If a system-crippling wave hits, it will do so when small
firms and individuals start filing at significantly increased rates, which
they haven’t. Of course, that might change. Perhaps the wave was postponed by the earlier stimulus programs and will arrive when those programs run out, or perhaps distress will deepen to a level that spurs on
small business filings.
If one thinks the wave is still likely, one might think the bankruptcy system needs support—more judges and other resources—to survive. Upon reflection, however, increasing the number of bankruptcy
judges in the face of this wave is an odd response. Historically, small
businesses don’t fare well in bankruptcy. They convert to Chapter 7 and
go out of business after wasting their remaining value on the bankruptcy process.103 And so the prediction is that courts will drown in a
wave of bankruptcy cases that the system is bad at handling, that too
many debtors with hopeless cases will seek relief in a system that cannot help them.
It is a strange response to that prediction to call for more judges.
More judges for what? Processing hopeless cases toward liquidation? If
lawmakers have the foresight now to see the wave coming and the political ability to do something about it, why prepare to process that wave
rather than prepare to stop it?
Preparing the bankruptcy courts is the wrong solution for this
problem. It is also the less politically feasible one. Lawmakers are likely
to find it politically easier to stop the wave than to add judges to manage
it. The judge question is a fraught one likely to involve local constituencies and political logrolling, and the addition of judges will likely face
more political hurdles than would an expensive bailout or stimulus
plan.104
If the choice is between adding dozens or hundreds more bankruptcy judges105 or doubling stimulus relief for small businesses, then
103

Baird & Morrison, supra note 90.
The allocation of bankruptcy judgeships can implicate powerful local interests among legal
professionals. To create hundreds of new judgeships is one thing but deciding where to put them
is another. Like the decades-old debate about venue reform, that question will be difficult to resolve without major political battles. Indeed, the history of the creation of new bankruptcy judgeships (most of them temporary) has demonstrated that this is a difficult issue on which to get
congressional movement.
105
See, e.g., Iverson et al., supra note 9 (estimating that the bankruptcy system could need as
104
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the lawmakers should double stimulus relief. This is a direct example
of the main point in this Article. Government action should focus on the
right problem with the right set of tools. If the goal is to stop a wave of
systemic economic distress, the government should provide stimulus. It
should not spend resources to reinforce a remedy for specific financial
distress that provides no systemic or economic relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
One cannot understand the right government tools in a crisis until
one understands the nature of the crisis and the purpose for government intervention. In a financial crisis, government actors might want
to save specific firms that have been affected, or they might want to
stabilize financial markets. In an economic crisis, their goal might be to
stop the spread of distress. Or the damage might be done, and the government actors just want to compensate firms or people for their losses.
Each specific goal will suggest a specific path of action.
The choice of tools in the current crisis has been suboptimal. The
government has yet to fully address the systemic economic challenges
posed by COVID-19. The appropriate response requires further economic stimulus for small businesses rather than bankruptcy reform.
The economic hardship is real and growing. And while the day of reckoning likely won’t arrive as a wave of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings, in
the absence of appropriate systemic economic relief, it will materialize
in some form.

many as 246 temporary judges); Letter from Jared A. Ellias (June 10, 2020), supra note 15 (calling
on Congress to appoint at least fifty temporary bankruptcy judges).

